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Credit Card Fraud Detection is a classification 
problem where different types of classification errors 
cause different costs. Previous works quantified the 
financial impact of data-driven fraud detection 
classifiers using a cost-matrix based evaluation 
approach, however, none of them considered the 
significant financial impact of false positives. Analysts 
reported that fraud prediction in e-commerce still has to 
deal with false positive rates of 30-70%, and many 
cardholders reduce card usage after being wrongly 
declined. In our paper, we propose a new method for 
assessing the cost of false positives and evaluate several 
state-of-the-art fraud detection classifiers using this 
method. Further, we investigate the effectiveness of 
ensemble learning as previous work supposed that a 
combination of diverse, individual classifiers can 
improve performance. Our results show that cost-based 
evaluation yields valuable insights for practitioners and 
that our ensemble learning strategy indeed cuts fraud 
cost by almost 30%. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Credit card fraud is a problem with strong economic 
impact. Although a lot of effort has gone into the design 
of secondary verification layers like 3D Secure or 
biometric transaction authentication, credit cards are 
still very susceptible to fraud, especially in e-commerce 
transactions [1]. Worldwide losses due to credit card 
fraud have been estimated to $28.65 billion in 2019, and 
are projected to reach $32.04 billion in 2021 [2]. Credit 
card fraud is commonly subdivided into Card-Present-
Fraud (CP), where the card is physically present at the 
time of the fraudulent transaction, and Card-Not-
Present-Fraud (CNP), where it is not, like with online 
transactions. According to recent data, 15 out of 100 
online transactions are turned down compared to only 
three out of 100 for in-store transactions [3]. 
Card issuers (mostly banks) and network providers 
(e.g. VISA or MasterCard) rely on Machine Learning 
(ML) for credit card fraud detection (CCFD). State-of-
the-art fraud detection systems combine a (confidential) 
set of transaction blocking rules with a data-driven ML 
model. This model typically employs a classifier, 
trained by ML algorithms on examples of genuine and 
fraudulent transactions, which can assign a 
suspiciousness score to an incoming transaction. 
Transactions exceeding a pre-set threshold are declined. 
[4]. Due to the economic potential, ML for CCFD has 
received a lot of attention, however, it remains 
challenging to achieve satisfying performance in 
practice. In particular, the susceptibility of the models to 
generate false declines (or false positives) is a major 
problem. They cause embarrassing situations for 
customers, lost revenue for merchants, and 
administrative overhead for issuers. Especially during 
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the connected 
increase in online transactions, false positives became 
an even bigger problem [3]. Analysts pointed out that 
false positives might cost more than fraud itself: 
Analysts estimated that in 2014 in the U.S., $9 billion 
were lost due to card fraud while $118 billion – 3% of 
the total U.S. retail market – of sales have been wrongly 
declined due to the fear of fraud. 26% of the surveyed 
customers reduced their card usage after being falsely 
declined, and 32% completely abandoned the card 
afterwards [5].  
Previous work on CCFD did not take into account 
the adverse financial impact of false positives. Most 
publications report only standard classification metrics 
such as accuracy, precision and recall [6,7,8]. Although 
some attempts have been made to quantify the financial 
impact of using ML for CCFD, all of them reduce the 
cost of false positives to a fixed administrative 
overhead, which heavily underestimates the true 
financial damage they cause. Our study addresses this 
gap by asking the following first research question 
(RQ): RQ1: How can classifiers for CCFD be evaluated 
in financial terms while incorporating the cost 
connected with false positives?  
Using statistical data on card usage from the Euro 
area, we construct an evaluation function for CCFD 
models that incorporates the operative cost as well as the 
potentially lost revenue that false positive cause for card 
issuers. We then evaluate the most prominent models for 
CCFD using this evaluation function. 





Ensemble learning showed to be effective for 
reducing false positives in other domains [9,10,11]. 
However, no publication has yet investigated its 
effectiveness in CCFD using state-of-the-art ML 
algorithms. Only one recent publication by [12] 
suggested combining a Random Forest with a Neural 
Network classifier as the predictions differ in the kind 
of frauds they detect. Following this call for further 
research, we also investigate: RQ2: Can ensemble 
learning help to mitigate the false positives problem? 
We will demonstrate that already simple ensemble 
learning strategies like majority voting can indeed help 
to mitigate the false positive problem, even if the 
participating models are already ensembles like 
Random Forests.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
In Section 2, we introduce the reader to the problem of 
CCFD and name the most important approaches found 
during our literature review for solving it. In Section 3, 
we review existing cost-based CCFD model evaluation 
strategies. Section 4 introduces the dataset used for 
training our models and presents the associated feature 
engineering steps. Section 5 describes the associated 
models Random Forests, Gradient-Boosted Decision 
Trees and Neural Networks. Further, we present our 
model evaluation strategy, including our proposed cost-
based evaluation of false positives. Section 6 reports 
results, while Section 7 discusses theoretical and 
practical implications as well as limitations of our work.  
 
2. Credit Card Fraud Detection 
 
Credit card fraud can be defined as any illegitimate 
use of a credit card against the interest of the cardholder, 
and CCFD is defined as the task of identifying the 
fraudulent transactions [13]. More formally, given a set 
of credit card transactions  𝑋 = [𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑁], where each 
transaction 𝑥𝑖 = [𝑥𝑖
1, 𝑥𝑖
2, … , 𝑥𝑖
𝐾] contains details like 
amount, currency, timestamp, etc., CCFD can be 
formulated as a supervised learning problem [14]. Each 
transaction has a class label 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0,1} assigned, where 
𝑦 = 1 denotes a fraudulent transaction and 𝑦 = 0 a 
genuine one. The goal of a machine learning algorithm 
for CCFD is to learn the class-conditional posterior 
distribution 𝑃(𝑦|𝑋) and predict the label ?̂?𝑁+1 of an 
unseen transaction 𝑥𝑛+1.  
Seminal publications on algorithmic CCFD 
exclusively used Neural Networks [15 – 18]. Since the 
mid-2000s, a vast set of models has been applied to 
solve the CCFD problem.1 The most prominent ML 
model for CCFD in research and practice nowadays is 
Random Forests [4,8]. Several studies have reported 
                                                 
1 [6, 19,20] have carried out systematic literature reviews. 
their superior performance when compared to others [7, 
14, 21]. Another effective model for CCFD is Gradient-
Boosted Decision Trees [22]. Although this algorithm 
has not yet received broad attention in academic 
research on CCFD, it is heavily used in competitive 
machine learning. In the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection 
Competition on kaggle2, for example, all top-ranked 
teams that reported on their solutions used some 
implementation of Gradient Boosting.   
Breiman [23] firstly introduced Ensemble Learning, 
the aggregation of multiple classification outcomes into 
one single prediction as Bagging. He proposed an 
ensemble consisting of individual classifiers built on 
random subsamples of the training set. Ensemble 
methods received broad attention with the 2006 awarded 
Netflix prize, where the winning solution was a 
classifier ensemble [24]. However, in CCFD, 
ensembling has received little attention so far. The only 
work that found a performance boost after ensembling 
Random Forests with Neural Networks was carried out 
by [25]. 
 
3. Cost-Based Evaluation of Credit Card 
Fraud Detection Models 
 
Cost-based evaluation is an appropriate method of 
evaluating a CCFD classifier, because firstly, businesses 
are usually interested in minimizing the cost 
accountable to card fraud and therefore need to trade off 
costs and potential savings when using an automated 
fraud detection system. Second, it is easier to compare a 
data-driven model to a human investigators team if both 
are evaluated in terms of financial savings. Third, CCFD 
is an instance of cost-sensitive learning problems [26], 
where different classification outcomes have a different 
financial impact. Table 1 shows a cost matrix, which 
assigns each classification result (true positive, false 
positive, true negative, false negative) a cost value 
(𝐶𝑇𝑃, 𝐶𝐹𝑃 , 𝐶𝑇𝑁, 𝐶𝐹𝑁). 
 
Table 1. Cost Matrix. 
 𝑦 = 1 (Fraud) 𝑦 = 0 (Genuine) 
?̂? = 1 𝐶𝑇𝑃 𝐶𝐹𝑃  
?̂? = 0 𝐶𝐹𝑁 𝐶𝑇𝑁 
Table 2 gives an overview of how previous studies 
populated this cost matrix. Cost-based evaluation for 
CCFD has been proposed firstly in the paper by Chan et 
al (1999) [27]. They assume no cost for true negatives 
and full cardholder imbursement in case of a missed 
fraud. If a transaction is wrongly declined or a fraud 
2 https://www.kaggle.com/c/ieee-fraud-detection/overview 
Page 1573
caught, they assume a constant administrative overhead 
𝐶𝑎 between $50 and $100 to incur, because in both 
cases, the cardholder must be contacted, the transaction 
must be investigated, a new card must be issued, et 
cetera. A transaction with a lower amount than 𝐶𝑎 is, 
however, not worth investigating. 
 
Table 2: Cost Matrices of Previous Work. 
 The study by Hand, et al. (2008) [28] does not use 
example-dependent costs because of the “fraud breeds 
fraud” argument − fraudsters getting away with small-
scale frauds are likely to continue in the future, and 
therefore all frauds have to be prevented. To illustrate 
magnitudes, they assume a false negative cost 100 times 
of 𝐶𝑎. Bahnsen, et al. (2013, 2015, 2016) [29, 30, 31] 
assume a constant 𝐶𝑎 for both false positives and false 
negatives and an example-dependent 𝐶𝐹𝑁 (the 
respective transaction amount) in their work on cost-
sensitive algorithms for CCFD. Wedge, et al. (2018) 
[32] is the only study so far that uses an example-
dependent 𝐶𝐹𝑃. They assume that a wrongly declined 
transaction goes through with 50% probability with the 
second try. If it doesn’t, then the issuer loses a 
transaction processing fee assessed at 1.75% of the 
transaction amount. Their evaluation approach, 
however, doesn’t include overheads. We argue that none 
of the previously explained approaches captures all 
aspects of the true cost, especially for false positives. 
Clearly, administrative costs occur with both false 
positives and false negatives. However, reducing 𝑪𝑭𝑷 to 
a fixed administrative overhead ignores the variable cost 
for the issuer caused by the lost processing fee. Taking 
a fixed percentage only of the current transaction 
amount is also too short-sighted. 
As the study [5] reported, 32% of cardholders stop 
using a card after being falsely declined. Therefore, if a 
cardholder decides to switch the issuer because of too 
many wrong declines, the card issuer loses not the 
transaction amount of this transaction, but also all other 
future transactions that this cardholder could have made. 
If the issuer charges service fees or a fixed yearly credit 
card cost, this money is lost as well. 
                                                 
3 https://www.kaggle.com/mlg-ulb/creditcardfraud 
4. Data  
Because of the intrinsically private nature of credit 
card data, publicly available, real-world credit card 
transaction datasets are scarce. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are currently only two: The first 
dataset was released together with the Ph.D. thesis of 
Dal Pozzolo (2015) [4]. It consists of 284,807 credit 
card and is available on kaggle3. The second dataset was 
issued as a part of the 2019 IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection 
competition on kaggle. It contains 590,540 labeled 
credit card transactions and was extracted from a 
production fraud detection system. We decided to use 
the latter dataset in our study because of the larger size 
and feature set. We don’t present a full feature list here 
for space reasons, but it is available online.4 Table 3 
reports a set of aggregated descriptive metrics (‘#’ 
denotes numbers, and ‘%’ percentages).  
4.1 Feature Engineering  
Because spending behavior varies from cardholder 
to cardholder, transactions that do not look outstanding 
from a global point of view might be unusual for a 
certain cardholder and indicate fraud. It is therefore 
helpful to add a set of derived features which form a 
cardholder profile. Here, we will use three feature sets: 
a baseline feature set containing only original features, 
an augmented feature set containing engineered features 
and a reduced feature set that removes correlated and 
unimportant features. Feature engineering for credit 
card fraud detection is a widely discussed topic, and 
many studies use a strategy that aggregates transaction 
data over a pre-defined timeframe [7,12,14,21,31] in a 
Recency-Frequency-Monetary style. The normal 
4 https://www.kaggle.com/c/ieee-fraud-detection/discussion/101203 
 
𝐶𝑇𝑃 𝐶𝐹𝑃  𝐶𝑇𝑁 𝐶𝐹𝑁 
Chan, et al. (1999) [27] 
𝐶𝑎 if 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡 > 𝐶𝑎, 
else 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡  
𝐶𝑎 if 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡 > 𝐶𝑎, else 0 0 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡  
Hand, et al. (2008) [28] 𝐶𝑎 𝐶𝑎 0 100𝐶𝑎  
Bahnsen, et al. (2016) [29] 𝐶𝑎 𝐶𝑎 0 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡  
Wedge, et al. (2018) [32] 0 0.5 × 1,75% × 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡  0 𝑇𝐴𝑚𝑡  
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cardholder behavior is characterized by the (1) Recency 
or the average time between previous transactions, by 
the (2) Frequency or the average amount spent in a given 
timeframe and the (3) Monetary value or the average 
amount spent in a given timeframe. 
Let 𝑆𝑡,𝑖𝑑  be the set of transactions made by a 
specific cardholder (named with an 𝑖𝑑) in the timeframe 
𝑡 ∈ {1ℎ, 3ℎ, 6ℎ, 12ℎ, 18ℎ, 24ℎ, 72ℎ, 168ℎ}.
Table 3. Essential Descriptive Metrics. 
#Transactions Timespan #Features #Genuine #Fraudulent 
590,540 6 Months 434 569,877 20,663 
%Genuine %Fraud  Total Amount Fraudulent Amount %Fraudulent Amt 
96.5 3.5 $79,738,948.74 $3,083,844.86 3.87 
Our derived features are (where 𝑇𝑥𝐷𝑇 is a Timedelta 
in seconds from a given reference datetime and denotes 
the point of time when the transaction was made): 
- Average timespan (𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑠𝑝) between the 









   
- Number of transactions (𝑇𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) in the given 
timeframe (Frequency): 
𝑇𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = |𝑆𝑖𝑑,𝑡| 
- Average transaction amount (𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑇𝑥𝐴𝑚𝑡) in the 









To calculate the aggregated features, we firstly 
engineered a cardholder identifier by using adversarial 
validation5. In real-world datasets, this identifier is 
given by the card number, but in the dataset at hand, the 
card number has been removed for privacy reasons. 
Next, we added time-based features based on the 𝑇𝑥𝐷𝑇 
field to track transaction month, day and hour. Finally, 
we calculated the aggregation values separately for each 
of the 8 timeframes and obtained 28 engineered features 
in total, therefore, we have 452 features in the 
augmented feature set. 
4.2 Feature Selection 
To remove unimportant features, we use two 
techniques: correlation analysis and a modified version 
of backward feature selection (for tree-based models 
only). For correlation analysis, we identified groups of 
correlated features (𝜌 > 0.9) and replaced the whole 
group by one feature. For backward feature selection, 
we reviewed the feature importances of the tree-based 
                                                 
5 http://fastml.com/adversarial-validation-part-two/ 
models, and removed zero-importance features as well 
as the least important 5% of the features. As soon as 
performance decreased, we stopped eliminating 
features. This process removed 26 features for Random 
Forests, 206 features for CatBoost and 17 features for 
XGBoost 
5. Model  
This section briefly introduces the individual 
classifiers Random Forests, Neural Networks, and the 
two Gradient Boosting variants XGBoost and CatBoost 
together with the parameterizations we used for training. 
Subsequently, we will outline the ensembling strategy 
to combine the predictions of the individual classifiers. 
Finally, we describe conventional and cost-based 
metrics to evaluate the models as well as the ensemble. 
5.1 Random Forests 
As described in Section 2, Random Forests are the 
industry standard in CCFD. Random Forests were 
introduced by [34] and are an ensemble method that 
combines predictions of multiple, de-correlated decision 
trees by majority vote. We used the implementation and 
the hyperparameter tuning strategy by scikit-learn [35]. 
Firstly, we successively increased the number of trees in 
the forest and did not find any further improvements for 
more than 1000 trees. Afterwards, we performed a grid 
search (an exhaustive search over a manually specified 
subset of the hyperparameter space) over different 
subsampling ratios and found the best results with 
training each tree on 20% of the features and 80% of the 
rows. To address the fact that fraudulent transaction 
represent only a tiny fraction of all transactions, we used 
the inverse of the imbalance ratio as class weights. 
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Random Forests cannot deal with categorical features 
natively, so we mapped each category to an integer.  
5.2 Gradient-Boosted Decision Trees 
Gradient-Boosted Decision Trees are another 
method of ensembling single tree predictions where 
each tree contributes a small “boost”, scaled by a 
learning rate, to the output [22]. The state-of-the-art 
implementation of gradient boosting is XGBoost 
(“eXtreme Gradient Boosting”) [36]. Because of its 
performance and scalability, XGBoost has quickly 
become a dominating solution for a wide range of 
problems, especially in competitive machine learning. 
We used the python implementation together with the 
parameters selected by the winning team of the kaggle 
competition. They identified a learning rate of 𝜌 =
0.02, a row subsampling rate of 0.8 and an ensemble 
size of 2000 estimators as optimal.6 We mapped each 
categorical feature to an integer value since XGBoost 
cannot handle categorical features natively. Another 
novel, but already quite popular boosting solution is 
CatBoost [37], a modified version of the standard 
boosting algorithm that can handle categorical features 
natively. It is interesting to see how CatBoost will 
perform on our dataset, because it contains a lot of 
categorical features, some of them with a high number 
of unique values. We had to limit the ensemble size to 
1000 because of RAM constraints. We set class weights 
as with Random Forests because without, performance 
decreased. 
5.3 Neural Networks 
Neural Networks (NNs) are a large family of 
statistical models and learning methods. NNs are a 
highly active area of machine learning research, and, 
besides that, have already found a large variety of 
applications from machine translation over medical 
imaging to financial analysis. Our Neural Network 
Architecture was adapted from a successful kaggle 
submission.7 It consists of three hidden layers, 256 
nodes each, with a learning rate of ρ=0,001 and a weight 
decay coefficient of 𝜆 = 0,0005. Before training, we 
standardized all numerical features and log-transformed 
those with large value range. For categorical features, 
we used One-Hot-Encoding, after reducing the 
cardinality for high-cardinality features by replacing 
infrequent categories with a uniform label. We tried to 
use learned embeddings as alternative, but saw worse 
results. As further regularization techniques, we use 
                                                 
6 https://www.kaggle.com/cdeotte/xgb-fraud-with-magic-0-9600 
Batch Normalization [38] and Dropout [39] with 0.3 
dropping probability. We also tried computations with 
increased depth of the NN up to ten hidden layers, but 
didn’t see any significant improvements. 
5.4 Ensembling Strategy 
Inspired by the work of [12], we investigate how 
strong the true positives of our models overlap to see if 
they detect different kinds of fraud. If they do so, 
combining their predictions in an ensemble probably 
improves the performance. We use the Jaccard Score to 
measure the classifiers’ prediction similarity. Given two 




𝑁1,0 + 𝑁0,1 + 𝑁1,1
 
where 𝑁𝑖,𝑗  is the number of transactions for which 
classifier 1 predicted class 𝑖 and classifier 2 predicted 
class 𝑗 [40]. For 𝑖 = 𝑗, we therefore say that the 
classifiers agree, and disagree otherwise. A Jaccard 
Score of 1 means that both classifiers made identical 
predictions on all transactions and a Jaccard Score of 0 
means that the classifiers did not agree on a single 
transaction. As we strive for maximum diversity within 
the ensemble, we suspect that adding a classifier with 
low prediction similarity to the models already in the 
ensemble improves the score stronger than adding a 
classifier with high similarity. 
We use majority voting for combining predictions: 
For a given transaction, the ensemble’s prediction is the 
class that the majority of the models predicted.  
5.5 Conventional Evaluation Metrics 
We evaluate each model against a set of 
conventional classification metrics (described in this 
section) and in financial terms (described below). 
Firstly, we report Precision and Recall for visualizing 
the proportion between false positives and false 
negatives. Like frequently found in the literature, as an 
overall classification quality metric, we use Area under 
the Precision-Recall Curve (AUPRC) instead of the 
popular Area under the Receiver Operating Curve 
(AUROC). It summarizes the trade-off between Recall 
and False Positive Rate, while AUPRC summarizes the 
trade-off between Precision and Recall [41]. Although 
they look similar, AUPRC is more informative in 
imbalanced classification settings. [42,43]. As a further 
standard metric that captures the trade-off between 
7 https://www.kaggle.com/c/ieee-fraud-        
detection/discussion/111476 
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precision and recall, we report the F1 score (harmonic 
mean of precision and recall). 
To measure the relative improvement or decline 
ensembling yielded, we do the following: For a given 
performance metric 𝑧, let 𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑔 be the average cross-
validated score of the individual classifiers participating 
in the ensemble and 𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑠 be the cross-validated 
ensemble score. We then report the relative 
improvement score 
 
%𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑠 − 𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑔)/𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑔. 
5.6 Financial Evaluation 
For financial evaluation, we use the cost matrix 
described in Section 3. Like in previous work, we 
assume no cost in case of a true negative, and an 
administrative overhead 𝐶𝑎 of $10 in case of false 
positives and true positives. If a fraud remains 
undetected, the lost amount is equal to the transaction 
amount (𝐶𝐹𝑁 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝐴𝑚𝑡). 
We quantify the additional financial impact of a false 
positive as follows: From the Statistical Data 
Warehouse of the ECB, we know that the number of 
issued credit cards in the Euro area in 2018 was 
108,071,580 and the total transaction value made with 
them was 336,679.541 Mln. € [44, 45]. Therefore, by 
dividing the total transaction value by the number of 
cards, we obtain an average yearly transaction value per 
card of 3,115.34 €. From the study by [5], we know that 
32% of wrongly declined customers drop the card. Like 
in the study by [32], we assume that that the issuer loses 
a transaction processing fee of 1,75% on this and the 
future potential transactions of this customer in 50% of 
the cases. Summarizing, to assess the cost of a false 
positive, we proceed as follows:  
- If a false positive occurs, the transaction passes with 
probability 50% at a second try. If it does, no cost 
occurs 
- If the transaction is rejected the second time as well, 
the false positive causes the administrative cost 
because the cardholder needs to be contacted. In 
this case, the customer drops his card with a 
probability of .32. 
- If the customer decides to drop the card, the next 
year’s revenue generated by this customer 1.75% ×
3,114.34€ = 54,51€ is lost. 
Therefore, on average, each false positive costs the 
issuer  
                                                 
8 We used the exchange rate of 12th of June, 2021 provided by Yahoo 
Finance. 
𝐶𝐹𝑃 = (0.5 × 10) + (0.5 × 0.32 × 0.175 ×
3.115,34€ ) = 15,63€. 
As the currency of the transactions in the dataset and 
in the literature are in USD, we use the dollar equivalent 
amount of $18.938. After having derived the cost of a 
single classification outcome, we can calculate the total 
cost accountable to credit card fraud like in the study by 
[31]: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖(?̂?𝑖𝐶𝑇𝑃 + (1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝐶𝐹𝑁) +
𝑁
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑦𝑖)(?̂?𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑃 + (1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝐶𝑇𝑁) , 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the class label and ?̂?𝑖 is the predicted class 
label of the transaction 𝑥𝑖  [31]. Because it is easier to 
interpret, we report the financial savings after applying 
this classifier by comparing it to a status quo where no 
classifier is used. If a card issuer decides not to use a 
fraud detection system at all, the lost amount on a given 
transaction set is equal to the sum of the amounts of the 
fraudulent transactions, that is 




 | 𝑦𝑖 = 1 
[31]. We then define financial savings that could be 
achieved after applying this classifier as the difference 
between the cost when no fraud detection system is used 
and 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑓): 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠(𝑓) = 𝐶𝑁𝑜𝐹𝐷𝑆 − 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑓), 
We also report savings as percentage of the total 
transaction amount. For evaluating the ensemble, we 
evaluate same as defined in Section 5.5. 
6. Results  
This section presents the results from evaluating the 
individual classifiers and the respective ensemble. All 
reported scores are results of a six-fold cross validation 
with months as folds. We didn’t intend to use more 
folds, as more folds would increase the computational 
burden and may hurt the model performance as many 
transactions recur on a regular, monthly basis. We 
further tried time series cross validation with the same 
number of folds and had hardly differing results. 
Table 4 shows the results of Random Forests and 
CatBoost, Table 5 of XGBoost and the NN. Firstly, we 
note that all models performed better than if no classifier 
was used. Even the worst classifier (CatBoost/Baseline) 
would still save the card issuer $140,006.27, which is 
approximately 0.9% of the total transaction amount. The 
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performance varies heavily for different models and 
feature sets. Classification quality ranges from .465 
AUPRC up to .665 AUPRC. Interestingly, the biggest 
difference in terms of classification performance is 
within one model: CatBoost achieves .465 AUPRC 
without feature engineering, which is the worst result 
among all models, and .665 after feature augmentation 
and reduction, which is the best AUPRC seen across all 
models. In financial terms, the worst model achieved 
savings of $140,006.27 (CatBoost/Baseline), while the 
best one (NN/Baseline) achieved savings of 
$325,111.82. XGBoost and CatBoost achieve similar 
scores in financial impact while they differ in the kind 
of errors made: CatBoost yields more false positives and 
less false negatives (lower precision), XGBoost yields 
less false positives and more false negatives. This 
difference reflects in the F1-Score: XGBoost has a 
consistently higher F1-Score than CatBoost as the 
number of false positives and false negatives is more 
balanced.  
A higher classification performance score does not 
always coincide with higher financial savings. For 
example, savings decrease with Random Forests after 
feature augmentation, but at the same time, AUPRC 
increases. The same observation holds for NNs. 
NN/Baseline has a Precision (Recall) of .315 (.755), 
while CatBoost/Reduced has precision (Recall) .276 
(.793). Even though the NN detected less fraudulent 
transactions (lower Recall), its cost accountable to false 
negatives is lower in absolute terms. This suggests that 
the NN successfully learned to classify high-value 
fraudulent transactions correctly because the false 
negative loss depends on the actual transaction amounts, 
while the false positive cost is a fixed average amount 
(see Section 5.6). Some models seem to profit more, 
some less from feature engineering. For NNs, adding 
derived features and removing correlated features hurts 
the predictive power of the model: In comparison to the 
baseline feature set,  NNs on the reduced feature set 
show a .007 decrease in AUPRC and achieve 
$23,937.24 (8.2%) fewer savings. In contrast, all tree-
based models show a positive response to the feature 
engineering. The most stunning result is for CatBoost: 
Without derived features, the model performs worse 
than all other models. 
Adding derived features and removing correlated 
ones boosts the savings by $131,457.73 (93,8%) and 
increases AUPRC by 0.2. For XGBoost and Random 
Forests, the effect is more moderate. Both models show 
a steady increase in predictive performance after 
augmentation and reduction. The savings decrease after 
augmentation, but the decrease is more than offset by 
the reduction. Quantitatively, Random Forests have 
$5,761 (1.3%) higher savings and .043 higher AUPRC 
on the reduced feature set than on the baseline feature 
set. XGBoost shows with $6,441 (1.9%) increase in 
savings and .024 increase in AUPRC the same 
magnitude of response to feature engineering. We now 
turn to investigate the ensembling results. Figure 1 
shows the Jaccard similarity scores between the trained 
models. We see that, unsurprisingly, most models from 
the same family have high Jaccard scores over .5. One 
exception is the CatBoost model with a strongly worse 
performance, as described above: It shared only .38/.39 























However, models from different families show a 
rather low prediction similarity. While the predictions 
of Random Forests and XGBoost still are relatively 
similar, CatBoost and NNs agree with other models 
maximally in 37% of transactions, but mostly in less. 
Among all possible combinations of our twelve models, 
the ensemble consisting of CatBoost/Reduced, 
NN/Baseline and XGBoost/Reduced showed the best 
result. Table 6 shows the corresponding scores. 
Interestingly, the ensemble yields benefits, even if some 
participating models are already ensembles by 
themselves (Random Forest and Gradient Boosting). 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study evaluated multiple state-of-the-art ML 
models and an ensemble consisting of three models      
for CCFD. In contrast to previous studies, we 
incorporated both the operational cost and the 
threatened revenue of card issuers in case of false 
positives in our cost-based evaluation model. By that, 
Figure 1. Jaccard prediction similarity between 
all models. 
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we answered RQ1. The evaluation showed that using 
NNs yields the highest financial savings, despite not 
showing the best classification performance by classical 
means (AUPRC/F1-Score). During experimentation, we 
also noted that the performance varied massively with 
the model parameters and with the feature engineering 
strategy.  
 
Table 4: Cross-validated scores for Random Forests and CatBoost. 
Feature Set 
Random Forests CatBoost 
Baseline Augmented Reduced Baseline Augmented Reduced 
Precision 0,68 0,73 0,75 0,166 0,273 0,276 
Recall 0,39 0,38 0,39 0,749 0,792 0,793 
AUPRC 0,513 0,530 0,556 0,465 0,664 0,665 
F1 0,492 0,491 0,508 0,271 0,402 0,404 
Fraud Cost $449.523,19 $459.188,74 $443.762,39 $475.762,52 $347.353,91 $345.304,57 
Savings $167.245,77 $157.580,23 $173.006,58 $140.006,27 $269.415,06 $271.464,00 
%TotalTrans 1,05% 0,99% 1,09% 0,88% 1,69% 1,70% 
 
Table 5: Cross-validated scores for XGBoost and the Neural Network. 
Feature Set 
XGBoost Neural Networks 
Baseline Augmented Reduced Baseline Augmented Reduced 
Precision 0,5 0,602 0,584 0,315 0,291 0,291 
Recall 0,589 0,556 0,577 0,755 0,764 0,762 
AUPRC 0,594 0,612 0,618 0,624 0,626 0,617 
F1 0,526 0,566 0,562 0,441 0,419 0,416 
Fraud Cost $344.342,60 $346.252,73 $337.900,90 $291.657,15 $301.391,46 $315.594,39 
Savings $272.426,36 $270.516,24 $278.868,08 $325.111,82 $315.377,51 $301.174,58 
%TotalTrans 2,16% 2,17% 2,12% 1,83% 1,89% 1,98% 
 
Table 6: Scores of the ensemble consisting of CatBoost/Red, XGBoost/Red and NN/Baseline. 














This highlights the importance of extensive model 
tuning and feature engineering. Different models 
differ in the kind of errors made. In this regard, 
although being superior in savings, NNs/CatBoost 
generated more false positives than Random Forests 
and XGBoost. This can be undesirable in a practical 
setting. Especially when a bank has a shortage of card 
fraud investigators, they are interested in receiving 
few but precise suspicious transaction alerts [8]. 
Which algorithms are appropriate to use in a concrete 
setting must be decided individually, given the 
specific resources and requirements a fraud detection 
system operator has: A card issuing fintech with a 
small team might tolerate less false positives than an 
established bank. Our developed cost-based classifier 
evaluation method can provide valuable insights for 
both.  
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We answered RQ2 by demonstrating that forming 
an ensemble of multiple models with low prediction 
similarity can significantly improve performance 
through a reduction in false positives: Precision 
increases by almost 25%, compared to the average 
Precision of the individual models. This increase is 
reflected in increased savings: By reducing the cost 
accountable to false positives, our ensemble saves 
almost 30% more than the average of savings achieved 
by the individual models. Comparing to other 
strategies for improving CCFD performance, 
ensembling has an impact of similar magnitude. The 
study by [31] observed a 35% increase in saving when 
adding features that capture the periodic spending 
patterns of cardholders. [32] found cost reduction 
potential of approximately 40% when using a deep 
feature synthesis algorithm (Both studies didn’t 
consider the potentially lost revenue in their 
evaluation, however).  
As with every study, our work has some 
limitations. First, our quantification of the cost 
associated with false positives is an underestimation, 
because a customer might switch to a new card issuer 
permanently, not only for one year. Further, it is likely 
that not only false positives have a deteriorating effect 
on customer experience and therefore cause cost. Also 
false negatives are likely to cause cost additional to the 
lost transaction amount. A customer who repeatedly 
found his card charged by fraudsters, without the 
interference of his bank, might also consider 
abandoning that card and switching to a new issuer 
even if she gets reimbursed. Our study encourages 
future research on the financial impacts of false 
positives. Practitioners like banks and card issuers can 
do such studies best because they have comprehensive 
data about their customers available. It would be 
interesting to see if some customers are more likely to 
drop their card after a false decline and how high the 
actual loss is, given that a cardholder decided 
abandoning his card. These losses depend on details of 
the invididual issuers’ business model.  
Further, future studies should explore the potential 
of ensemble learning for CCFD in greater detail. It 
would be interesting to verify our results on a more 
extended dataset with fully available features, and to 
explore larger and/or more diverse ensembles 
comprising models with different architecture. 
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